The Chambers Chronicles - Michaelmas 2025 edition: Part II

Contents:

Part II

Family Law

·  Illustrious ‘fairness’ in UK and Japanese Martial Property Division

Public Law

·  Judicial Review and Proscription: R (Ammori) v Home Secretary

Civil Law

·  Mazur v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP: The Cost of Conduct is Chaos

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Family Law

Illustrious ‘fairness’ in UK and Japanese Martial Property Division

By Isabella Cheuk

Introduction

The pursuit of a ‘fair’ division of marital property is a universal challenge in family law, yet its definition remains deeply contested. As legal systems are shaped by their unique cultural and historical contexts, fairness is a principle that is universally endorsed but never universally defined. This article explores this tension through a comparative analysis of two distinct approaches: the equality-based principle established by the UK's landmark case of White v White, and Japan's statutory "half-rule," which emerged from a profound socio-legal transformation.[1] While both systems claim to achieve fairness, their methodologies differ radically. By examining judicial innovation in the UK and legislative reform in Japan, this article assesses what constitutes a truly equitable divorce outcome.

From needs to fairness— ‘yardstick of equality’ in White v White

Before White v White, UK courts applied a ‘reasonable needs’ standard, prioritising the lower-earning spouse’s basic requirements over their marital contributions. Three types of compensation under the ‘reasonable needs’ standard include a lump sum for housing and future expenses, periodical payments to cover monthly living costs, and child-related needs(if any).^[2] The major problem surfaced in ‘big money’ cases, where most of the surplus wealth that was earned during marriage was allocated to the primary earner after these needs were met. These cases often produced unequal outcomes and perpetuated gender roles, prevailing breadwinner bias. For example, in Dart v Dart [1996] 2 FLR 286, the wife of a multimillionaire (worth £400-800 million) was only awarded £9 million, with the court declining her appeal for a higher share by the ‘reasonable needs’ standard. Similarly, in A v A, the wife of another millionaire worth £200 million was only awarded £4.4 million after a 14-year marriage.[3] In both extreme cases, the court treated the homemaker’s ‘reasonable needs’ as the ceiling rather than recognizing their role in wealth creation and treated the marriage as anything but an equal economic partnership. The extremely disproportionate allocation of the asset also reflected the underlying unfairness that women must face before, illustrating a notorious image of the courts upholding the stereotype of women being incapable and worth less than their husbands. 

The landmark ruling in White revolutionized the UK’s approach to assessing division of marital assets in divorce cases by rejecting ‘reasonable requirements’ as the organising principle and introducing the idea of 'yardstick of equality' to check potential awards for discrimination, thereby undermining the stereotype of the husband being the breadwinner and the wife the homemaker as a form of fairness check. Under the pre‑White ‘reasonable requirements’ model, the court’s primary focus was on satisfying the weaker spouse’s needs, so that needs operated as a ceiling rather than a share of the jointly created wealth. In the ruling, Lord Nicholls established that there should be ‘no discrimination between husband and wife and their respective roles’^[4], signalling a departure from situations in which equality can be achieved only for strong reasons, such as inheritance or pre-marital assets.

However, after the introduction of the concept of ‘yardstick equality’ in White’s judgement, the courts were able to exercise a degree of judicial discretion within a fairness framework, adjusting the proportions or certain aspects of the assets to achieve equal contributions between the spouses, considering all circumstances^[5]. Besides, this rule views marriage as a partnership, with no bias in favour of the breadwinner over the homemaker, since it assumes that both contribute equally to the family. Specifically, in recent cases, the courts have awarded a fairer amount of assets to the homemakers. For instance, in TM v KM [2020] EWHC 466 (Fam), the courts awarded a compensatory sum of £500k to a wife who gave up a career in investment banking, resulting in diminished earnings. Likewise, in RC v JC [2022] EWFC 155, compensation was also awarded to parties who were disadvantaged by the relationship.

Even though the newly introduced concept eased the problem of unfair marital asset division, it is nebulous, inherently subjective, and elusive^[6]. Fairness is still defined by the court (specifically the judge); as a result, different people reach different conclusions about what fairness requires, ultimately increasing its unpredictability in case judgments. Besides, the judgement in White is a subjective test that requires judges to consider all circumstances and facts of the marriage, rather than accurately reflecting the ever-changing social and moral values that the court may not acknowledge.

Consequently, while the White ruling successfully established a powerful principle of equality, its practical application remains vague and uncertain, as it depends on how a court interprets the ever-changing idea of fairness.

From Lineage to Equality: The 1947 Civil Code

Drastically different from the UK, before Japan’s reform of matrimonial laws after the Second World War, the Japanese household system ‘ie’ (in Japanese いえ or 家 in kanji means household) was the dominant family structure. This was highlighted in the Meiji Civil Code under Minpo (Eng: Civil Code) 1898, which defined the hierarchical system within an ‘ie’. The system stated that only the male head of the household should be able to control and distribute the family’s assets and property, which were usually passed to the eldest son^[7]. The Code also supports the Neo-Confucian view that only men carry on the family name. According to Isono, all members of the family must be unconditionally obedient to the male head of the house, and all decisions regarding marriage and divorce should be made in a way that benefits the ‘ie’^[8]. Therefore, women and younger children were unable to own property, inherit the family estate, or even initiate divorce because they were legally unable to raise a claim. Traditional values in Japan were deeply embedded in citizens, further marginalizing women’s interests in fair property claims.

Nevertheless, after the war, Japan’s new constitution and the 1947 Civil Code statutorily eliminated legal gender discrimination in property rights and marriage. In the Constitution of Japan 1947, Article 14 stated that all people are equal under the law and should not be discriminated in any way^[9], while Article 24(2) explicitly mentioned that for all marriage matters, including division of marital property and divorces. The law should also be enacted ‘from the standpoint of individual dignity and the essential equality of the sexes’^[10]. A clear reading of the Constitution shows that it has significantly improved fairness in the division of property assets by effectively abolishing gender-based inequality practices^[11].

Even so, Japan continues to face challenges in achieving practical fairness and equality, as traditional social norms persist. Neo-Confucianism has been deeply rooted in Japanese culture and practices, as reflected in aspects that primarily affect one’s contribution to the household, such as wages. According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Act 1985, Article 2 established that women workers have a significant role in the family, namely, the care of children^[12]. This statement implies that women can work and earn income as breadwinners only if doing so does not harm the family^[13]. Besides, the fu-you system (Japanese: 扶養) in Japan is a tax and social security scheme rewarding spouses (usually female) for keeping income below a threshold and thus reinforces economic dependence, which further restricts women’s household earnings as being the breadwinner suggests the other spouse contributes less by neglecting homemaking^[14], hence highly affecting the court’s discretion on the division of assets.

In sum, although the 1947 Constitution and Civil Code successfully abolished the legal architecture of gender discrimination, the law has been consistently challenged by deeply entrenched social norms and economic structures, raising questions about its practicality and whether fairness has truly been achieved.

Differences in both jurisdictions and potential reforms

Although both jurisdictions aim to achieve fairness and equality in marital property division, the outcomes and approaches differ markedly. In the UK, the change was jurisdictional. By introducing the ‘yardstick of equality’ in White as a guiding principle for fairness, it created a flexible but subjective standard, granting judges significant discretion. Contrastingly, in Japan, it was both legislative and revolutionary, as it involved a complete overhaul of laws while going against traditional social norms. In terms of impact, the legislative reform in Japan was more concrete, as it statutorily abolished the ‘ie’ system and replaced it with precise wording on equality in marriage. While in the UK, the ‘yardstick of equality’ is merely a guidance for courts to take discretion when considering the facts of the case. However, the situation in Japan was more dire and unfair than in the UK before their respective reforms as spouses were unable to claim any marital assets in Japan. At the same time, it is possible in the UK (despite its unfairness).

Yet both countries faced difficulties when enacting the relevant rules and legislation. In the UK, the subjectivity introduced uncertainty due to the high degree of judicial discretion granted by the rule. As for Japan, deeply entrenched traditional social norms greatly hinder the practical application of the laws despite the sharp legal shift.

To tackle the above problems, both nations introduced different concepts and reforms to address potential issues the country may face. For example, in the UK, Thrope LJ in Cowan v Cowan [2001] EWCA Civ 679 acknowledged the problem and suggested clearer guidance for ancillary relief to tackle reduced predictability. In 2024, the Law Commission also published a scoping report proposing changes to the system, suggesting the enactment of statutory guidance to increase predictability in financial remedies^[15]. While in Japan, Article 768 of the Japanese Civil Code adopted a similar approach to White’s approach in the UK, allowing courts to divide marital property ‘appropriately’ after divorce while factoring in the contributions of spouses. It also grants courts discretion to compensate economically disadvantaged spouses, helping address unfairness caused by income disparities^[16].

Conclusion

In conclusion, although both countries demonstrated significant progress toward fairness in marital property division, there was unfortunately no quick solution to resolve the underlying problems they are currently facing. Despite the tension between legal principles and socio-economic reality, both nations should continue to pursue fairness through reforms, ultimately delivering justice for underrepresented parties in divorce cases.

[1] [2000] UKHL 54 1 AC 596

[2] [1973] Fam 72

[3] [1998] 2 FLR 936

[4] ibid

[5] White (no.1)

[6] [2006] 2 AC 618

[7] Yuko Uemura, ‘What has Changed in Japan? Case Studies of Women’s Life Paths from the Last Two Decades’ (2021) 1 Journal of East Asian Cultures 231, 232

[8] Fujiko Isono, ‘The Evolution of Modern Family Law in Japan’ (1998) 2 International Journal of Law and the Family 183, 186

[9] Article 14, The Constitution of Japan 1947

[10] Article 24(2), The Constitution of Japan 1947

[11] Annette Marfording, ‘Gender Equality under the Japanese Constitution’ (1996) 29(3) Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America 324, 332

[12] Article 2, Equal Employment Opportunity Act 1985

[13] Annette (no.14)

[14] Polina Lukyantseva, ‘Feminism in Modern Japan: A Historical Review of Japanese Women’s Issues on Gender’ (2023) 25(2) Journal of International Women's Studies 1, 6

[15] Law Commission, ‘Financial Remedies on Divorce’ (lawcom.gov.uk website, 2024) < https://lawcom.gov.uk/project/financial-remedies-on-divorce/>  accessed 24^th November 2025

[16] Article 768, Japanese Civil Code

Public Law

Judicial Review and Proscription: R (Ammori) v Home Secretary

By William Powell

On the 17^th of October 2025, the Court of Appeal ruled that Ms Huda Ammori, a co-founder of Palestine Action, could challenge the decision to proscribe the group as a terrorist organisation by way of judicial review^[1]. The Court dismissed the government’s appeal, clarifying that the statutory alternatives – applying for deproscription and appealing to the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission (POAC) – were not an adequate substitute for judicial review. Unlike judicial review, the mechanisms focus on whether an organisation should remain proscribed at the time of review, rather than on the lawfulness of the original decision-making process: they are limited in their ability to scrutinise procedural defects or public law errors at the initial point of proscription, and cannot produce authoritative rulings of general application in the way that judicial review is capable of. Thus, the High Court will hear Ms Ammori’s challenge in November, focusing on the lawfulness of the original proscription decision itself.

Crucially, the Court of Appeal’s ruling is procedural. It does not determine whether the proscription is justified, nor does it comment on the lawfulness of said proscription. Instead, it confirms that judicial scrutiny is available as a proper mechanism for reviewing executive decisions of this kind. From a public law standpoint, the judgment reinforces the principle that executive power – even in the context of counterterrorism – remains subject to judicial oversight.

Palestine Action is a direct-action group campaigning on issues related to Palestinian rights and recognition. Under Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000, the Home Secretary may proscribe a group as a terrorist organisation if it is ‘concerned in terrorism’.^[2] Section 3 goes on to define this further, stating an organisation is ‘concerned in terrorism’ if it ‘(a) commits or participates in acts of terrorism, (b) prepares for terrorism, (c) promotes or encourages terrorism, or (d) is otherwise concerned in terrorism’.

Terrorism itself is defined in Section 1 of the Act as the use or threat of action designed to influence the government or intimidate the public, for the purpose of advancing political, religious or ideological goals, where the action involves serious violence against a person, endangering their life or serious damage to property. Here, the inclusion of property damage is significant; while the Act requires such damage to be ‘serious’, the boundaries of that label are not clearly defined, and historically proscription has been reserved for organisations associated with lethal violence or direct threats to life. Supporters of Palestine Action argue that its activities – such as vandalism, graffiti and disruption – fall short of the threshold set out by the Act, raising questions about whether proscription power is being extended beyond its intended scope.

Importantly, for supporters of members of Palestine Action, the proscription carries higher penalties than through standard criminal prosecution: membership, inviting support, or displaying symbols of the group can result in sentences ranging up to 14 years’ imprisonment, compared with shorter sentences under ordinary criminal law; consequences also include removal of online material, restrictions on messaging and communication, asset freezes and the use of immigration powers, such as exclusion from the UK. Following a break-in and vandalization at RAF Brize Norton in July, the government proscribed Palestine Action, thereby triggering this extensive legal regime.

The decision to do so proved controversial. Firstly, the group was bundled together with two neo-Nazi groups in a single order for proscription, meaning Parliament was required to accept all three designations together, or none at all. Several MPs criticised this approach as putting pressure on them to vote in favour of proscription despite concerns about whether Palestine Action met the legal test. More broadly, critics argued that the decision marked a shift in the application of counterterrorism law; Dr Alan Greene of the University of Birmingham argued that reliance on property damage, such as vandalism, represented a departure from previous proscriptions, while Volker Türk, the UN Human Rights Chief, warned that applying these laws to actions that do not meet international definitions of terrorism risks criminalising protest and restricting freedom of expression^[3]. Taken together, these concerns illustrate the wider debate that surrounds the scope and application of counterterrorism powers by the executive. It is against this backdrop that the Court was asked to consider not the merits of the proscription itself, but the appropriate legal forum for testing its lawfulness.

The Court of Appeal, comprising Lady Chief Justice Baroness Carr, Lord Justice Lewis, and Lord Justice Edis, unanimously confirmed that Ms Ammori could proceed with a High Court challenge. Central to their reasoning was the principle that the existence of a statutory alternative does not, by itself, oust the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction. Giving the leading judgement, Lady Carr CJ emphasised that deproscription and POAC appeals are forward-looking mechanisms, concerned with whether an organisation should remain proscribed, rather than whether the original decision was made lawfully, such as whether relevant considerations were made and whether the decision was carried out for a proper purpose^[4]. The Court of Appeal also rejected the government’s argument that differences in speed, practical detriment to Ms Ammori and others, and the implications for those facing criminal charges were insufficient to justify judicial review.

In allowing the claim to proceed, the Court also expanded the scope of the challenge by permitting two additional grounds, bringing the total to four^[5]. First, Ms Ammori argues that the Home Secretary failed to take into account relevant considerations, including the full range of Palestine Action’s activities – many of which are non-violent and fall below the threshold of criminal liability – as well as the level of public support the group has attracted. Second, it is alleged that the Home Secretary (then Yvette Cooper) failed to follow her own published policy, which requires that any proscription decisions must be proportionate, even where the legal test is met. Third, Ms Ammori contends that the proscription power was exercised for an improper purpose, on the basis that Parliament did not intend the regime to apply to civil disobedience groups whose actions, though potentially unlawful, do not align with the statutory threshold of terrorism. Finally, the claim includes an asserted breach of the Public Sector Equality Duty under Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010, on the basis that the Home Secretary did not adequately consider the impact of the proscription on affected groups, including Palestinians in the United Kingdom. Collectively, these grounds raise substantive issues concerning the limits of executive power alongside the proportionality and consequences of proscription.

Although the Court of Appeal’s decision was procedural, it engages with broader legal principles that govern the exercise of state power. By confirming that Ms Ammori is entitled to pursue judicial review, the judgment reinforces the supervisory role of the courts over executive action, even on questions of national security. The upcoming High Court review will therefore examine the extent to which proscription powers under the Terrorism Act can lawfully be applied to political activism and civil disobedience, and whether decisions of this kind sufficiently adhere to requirements of proportionality, relevance, and statutory equality duties.

While the underlying challenge raises issues relating to freedom of expression and assembly under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Court of Appeal did not address these rights directly. Instead, it ensured that the High Court will be able to assess the legality of the Home Secretary’s decision within the established legal framework – considering questions of procedural fairness, compliance with published policy, and adherence to duties owed under the Equality Act.

The substantive hearing of the judicial review is scheduled for late November 2025; at that stage, the High Court will consider the four grounds in full. By the time this commentary is published, the case will already have been heard, and the judgment may still be pending. But it remains an important case to follow because it raises significant questions about the limits of executive discretion, the legal boundaries of proscription powers, and the mechanisms of oversight available when national security laws intersect with political protest. Whatever the eventual outcome, the proceedings offer a valuable illustration of how public law mechanisms operate to ensure that decisions of considerable constitutional, political and social importance are subject to clear judicial scrutiny.

As the case moves to the High Court, it offers a clear example of how the judiciary balances executive discretion with the need for accountability and adherence to fundamental legal principles. In that sense, the Court of Appeal’s decision stands as a reminder of the continuing role of judicial review in delineating the lawful scope of state power in sensitive, and often contested, areas of decision-making.

[1] Ammori -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1311. Press release available at: https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Ammori-v-Secretary-of-State-for-the-Home-Department-Press-summary-17.10.25.pdf

[2] Terrorism Act 2000, s3(4). Available online at: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/3

[3] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/07/uk-palestine-action-ban-disturbing-misuse-uk-counter-terrorism-legislation

[4] https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Ammori-v-Secretary-of-State-for-the-Home-Department-17.10.25.pdf

[5] Ammori -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1311. Press release available at: https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Ammori-v-Secretary-of-State-for-the-Home-Department-Press-summary-17.10.25.pdf

Civil law

Mazur v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP: The Cost of Conduct is Chaos

By Imogen Golding-Douglass

Introduction 

The High Court’s decision in Mazur v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP sent shockwaves through the legal community.[1] It is, however, the Solicitors’ Regulatory Authority’s (SRA) position that the judgment has not altered the statutory framework provided for in the Legal Services Act 2007 (LSA).[2] This position was not anticipated by much of the legal community, which has expressed concern about the lack of guidance emanating from the regulatory authorities, as well as explaining that the judgment is woefully ignorant of the realities of legal practice.[3]  

As will be established, the decision in Mazur reinforces the position of the LSA 2007. In doing so, however, the judgment fails to consider the statutory history and status quo, which firms have been led to believe are acceptable by the SRA. The ramifications of the decision run much deeper than first glance, with implications for costs lawyers, legal executives and those who are CILEX qualified.   

The Facts and Procedural History 

The facts of the Mazur judgment, which will undoubtedly become well-known, can be stated briefly. The Respondent, a law firm, concluded legal work for the Appellants; however, the Appellants failed to pay a fee of £54,263.50.[4] Goldsmith Bowers Solicitors (GBS), another law firm, was instructed by the Respondents to recover the debt.[5] GBS signed a Claim Form, and a Mr Peter Middleton, “Head of Commercial Litigation”, signed the Particulars of Claim.[6]  

The Appellants challenged the claim filed by GBS by putting in a Defence and Counterclaim. They submitted that Mr Middleton, who was conducting the litigation, was not qualified to do so because he did not have a practising certificate.[7] An application for directions was made, which was opposed by the Respondent, and a stay of proceedings was ordered.[8] 

In an application by the Respondent to lift the stay, it was submitted on behalf of the Respondent that Mr Middleton was an authorised person to conduct litigation by virtue of s21(3)(b) of the LSA 2007 as he was an employee of GBS, which was “a regulated body being duly authorised".[9] On behalf of the Appellants, it was contended that an employee of an authorised person could not carry out reserved legal activities without authorisation themselves.[10] Ultimately, the stay was lifted and the Appellants were ordered to pay the costs of the application.[11] It is this decision that the Appellants appealed against.  

The Judgment in the High Court 

The Grounds of Appeal to the High Court effectively related to a question as to whether His Honour Judge Simpkiss erred in holding that “Mr Middleton was authorised to conduct litigation under the supervision of Mr. Ashall”, and a further question as to costs.[12] 

Regarding the first question, which is the overriding point of interest, the Appellants submitted that the scope of Section 21 of the LSA 2007 was only concerned with the breadth of the regulation possible by the SRA and other regulatory bodies.[13] In other words, Section 21(3) outlines the categories of people who may be subject to regulatory authority regulation.  For the Respondents, it was submitted that Section 21(3) conferred authority on Mr Middleton as an employee of an authorised person, to carry out reserved legal activity whilst under supervision.[14] In other words, Section 21(3) brought employees of authorised persons into the scope of those authorised to conduct reserved legal activities under Section 12 LSA 2007.  

Sheldon J held that “mere employment by a person who is authorised to conduct litigation is not sufficient for the employee to conduct litigation themselves, even under supervision”.[15] The only two circumstances (Section 13(2) LSA 2007) in which a person may conduct litigation are if they are authorised to do so (Section 18 LSA 2007) or fall within one of the exempt categories (Section 19 LSA 2007). As such, Mr. Middleton was not entitled to conduct litigation under the supervision of Mr. Ashall.[16] Section 21(3) does not extend the scope of who is authorised to carry out reserved legal activities; it defines who is subject to the regulatory authority of regulatory bodies.[17]

Discussion 

Given the clarity of language with which Sheldon J concluded, it may appear surprising that the judgment has been the source of such controversy. Section 13 and Section 21(3) do not use the same term; Section 13 refers to “authorised persons”, where Section 21(3) refers to “regulated persons”.[18] Much of the central misapplication of the LSA 2007 appears to emanate from a failure to distinguish between “authorised” and “regulated” persons. From a perspective of legal textualism, Sheldon J’s analysis indeed extracts the plain meaning from Section 13 and Section 21(3) LSA 2007. Based on a careful reading of the statute, it becomes clear that Sheldon J’s decision gives the plain meaning interpretation to the provisions. Since the handing down of the judgment, the Law Society has emphasised that the Legal Services Act 2007 (LSA 2007) remains the statutory framework for regulating who is authorised to conduct reserved legal activities.[19] On the face of both of those provisions, Mazur does restate the statutory framework, as both sections refer to different categories of persons.  

The legal community has, however, had ample basis to criticise the Mazur judgment, as there is good reason for the prevailing misapplication of the LSA 2007 since it was introduced.[20] The concerns arising from Mazur are threefold. Firstly, there is a question as to whether the LSA 2007 was meant to have the effect of changing the pre-2007 position that non-authorised persons were authorised to conduct litigation under the supervision of an authorised lawyer. Secondly, the legal community criticised a lack of guidance and support from regulatory bodies, who appear to have misapplied the LSA 2007 themselves since its conception. Finally, there is an overarching issue anticipated regarding the impact Mazur will have on the recoverable costs in the near future.  

The LSA 2007 was not intended to change the position that non-authorised persons could conduct litigation under the supervision of authorised lawyers. Miller and Nelson demonstrated that the explanatory notes of the LSA 2007 made it clear that it did not intend to change the status quo in that regard.[21] It is further clear from the contemporary literature on the topic that those regulated under Section 21(3) were believed to be authorised.[22] Put simply, the explanatory note of the LSA 2007 makes clear that the customs of the legal profession were not to be changed.[23] As the LSA 2007 did not purport to enact change in this area, it should be considered a likely basis for the misapplication post-2007, as the legal profession was not anticipating the LSA to have the effect in Mazur, based on the statute’s drafting.  

Notwithstanding legal textualism, the plain meaning interpretation has evidently not transpired in practice since 2007. Hyde demonstrates that firms, under pressure to reduce costs, have sought alternatives to conduct litigation.[24] The LSA 2007 has now been in force for 18 years, yet Mazur breaks new ground in articulating that the Act did change the pre-2007 position, contrary to what had been thought for the past 18 years.[25] A great proportion of the criticism levelled at the SRA’s response to the Mazur judgment has been centred around the SRA’s “shock” that the LSA 2007 has been so severely misinterpreted.[26] The SRA itself erroneously told GBS that its employees were permitted to undertake reserved legal activities, suggesting that the regulatory body itself failed to grasp the textual distinctions between Section 13 and Section 21(3) LSA 2007.[27] This raises the question of how individual legal professionals can be expected to derive the correct meaning from the LSA 2007, if one of the regulatory bodies cannot. Ultimately, the impact of any changes the LSA 2007 made to the pre-2007 position has not been felt until now, with a result of 18 years of misapplication.  

The impact that Mazur may have on the profession need not be hypothesised, as it has already begun.  

District Judge Richard Lumb, speaking extrajudicially, explained that Mazur’s impact has commenced in relation to costs.[28] In dealing with a housing possession case involving a private landlord and tenant dispute where the tenant had to pay the landlord’s reasonable costs, it became clear that a Grade D paralegal had conducted the case.[29] Accordingly, costs of £3,000 were disallowed, and the solicitors were given fixed recoverable costs of £500, including the court issue fee. As the paralegal was the only person conducting the litigation, and they were not authorised to do so, the costs were disallowed. It should be considered that these decisions are the first of many to come with regard to the past conduct of litigation.  

Conclusion 

In conclusion, the judgment in Mazur did restate the statutory framework in the LSA 2007. However, the legal community has a solid basis to support 18 years of misapplication and misunderstanding. The judgment has had the effect of suggesting that the LSA 2007 changed the pre-2007 position, which was not understood when the Act was implemented. Further, it appears that everyone, including the regulatory bodies, has made the same error. As for the post-Mazur future, there will be certain implications for the cost of litigation.  

[1] [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB).

[2] Solicitors Regulation Authority, ‘SRA Statement following the case of Julia Mazur & Ors v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP’ (Solicitors Regulation Authority, 1 October 2025) < https://www.sra.org.uk/news/news/mazur-charles-russell-speechlys/> accessed 11 November 2025

[3] John Hyde, ‘Mazur Blues’ (Law Society Gazette, 2 October 2025)

[4] Mazur (n 1) [2]

[5] Ibid

[6] Ibid

[7] Ibid [3]

[8] Ibid [4]

[9] Ibid [6]

[10] Ibid [7]

[11] Ibid [10]

[12] Ibid [13]-[16]

[13] Ibid [17]

[14] Ibid [21]

[15] Ibid [49]

[16] Ibid [48]

[17] Ibid [60]-[63]

[18] Ibid [60]-[62]

[19] SRA (n 2)

[20] Neil Rose, ‘Mazur “The Inadvertent Result” of Legal Services Act Drafting’ (LegalFutures, 22 October 2025) < https://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/mazur-the-inadvertent-result-of-legal-services-act-drafting> accessed 11 November 2025

[21] Ibid

[22] Andrew Boon, Professionalism under the Legal Services Act 2007 [2010] 17(3) IJLP 195, 200

[23] Iain Miller and Stephen Nelson, ‘Mazur – A Problem 300 Years in the Making’ (LegalFutures, 22 October 2025) < https://www.legalfutures.co.uk/features/mazur-a-problem-300-years-in-the-making> accessed 11 November

[24] Hyde (n 3)

[25] Miller and Nelson (n 24)

[26] Andrew Chalmers, ‘Mazur v Charles Russell: Everyone’s Been Doing This Wrong’ (Guildford Chambers Barristers, 24 October 2025) < https://guildfordchambers.com/news/mazur-v-charles-russell-everyones-been-doing-this-wrong/> accessed 13 November 2025

[27] Hyde (n 3)

[28] Nick Hilborne, ‘Judge Slashes Law Firm’s Costs because of Mazur’ (LegalFutures, 29 October 2025) < https://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/judge-slashes-law-firms-costs-because-of-mazur> accessed 13 November 2025

[29] Ibid