The Chambers Chronicles - Michaelmas 2025 edition: Part I

Contents:

Part I

Criminal Law

·  The Criminal Justice System; A System In Peril?: A Critical Analysis of Labour’s Threat to Jury Trials

Land Law

·  The Renters’ Rights Act 2025 – more or fewer rights for tenants?

Commercial Law

·  Inside Hogan Lovells’ historic win for PrivatBank against former owners

·  Economic Sanctions and the Courts: Proportionality Under Pressure

·  Preparation, Preparation, Preparation” - Camilla Bingham KC on Success at the Commercial Bar.

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Criminal Law

The Criminal Justice System; A System In Peril?: A Critical Analysis of Labour’s Threat to Jury Trials

By Annabelle Martin

Despite decades of struggle, the UK’s Criminal Justice System (CJS) is now seemingly at tipping point, beset by deep-rooted problems that threaten the very fundaments of its existence. With many barristers now vowing to ‘bring the courts to their knees,’^[1] one must ask: how has a Labour government, led by a former high-profile human rights QC, allowed matters to escalate to this stage? This article endeavours to answer this question.

The State of the CJS

The CJS is currently in a precarious state with academics and practitioners alike warning that reform is urgently needed. Chronic court backlogs, underfunded legal aid, overburdened police forces, and overcrowded prisons have created a system struggling to function effectively. The impact this has on aspiring legal professionals cannot be ignored either as talent is directed towards more lucrative opportunities in commercial practice which contrasts starkly with the underfunded chambers and low pay that is more prevalent in criminal practice.

Public confidence is similarly eroding; the 2025 Crime Survey for England and Wales highlighted that only 48% of Respondents were confident in the CJS^[2] as delays and high-profile failures such as the Post Office Scandal give the impression that justice is neither swift nor fair. The combination of systemic underfunding and professional dissatisfaction leaves the CJS teetering on the edge of dysfunction, and susceptible to radical and ill-considered reforms with potentially detrimental consequences for both the public and the future of criminal law.

The Importance of Jury Trials

The right to a jury trial is not merely tradition, but it is a safeguard of impartiality, community participation, and legitimacy that has existed for centuries, enshrined in the Magna Carta and implemented most notably since Henry II. Academics such as Thom Brooks highlight that juries ‘better ensure impartiality’ and Brooks goes so far as to claim that ‘a judicial system using jurors is superior to a judiciary run exclusively by professional judges.’^[3] This is because juries bring together citizens from diverse backgrounds, allowing collective deliberation that reflects broader societal values whilst simultaneously providing a check on potential biases or overreach by professional judges. This ensures that verdicts are not only legally sound, but are also perceived as legitimate by the public as it ensures fairness and transparency.

The historical significance of this safeguard is powerfully illustrated by the 1671 Bushel Case^[4]. During the trial of Quaker preachers William Penn and William Mead, the jury repeatedly refused to return a guilty verdict despite intense pressure from the trial judge. Frustrated, the judge fined and imprisoned the jurors – including Edward Bushel – until they delivered the ‘correct’ verdict. Bushel challenged this unlawful detention, and the Court of Common Pleas ruled that jurors cannot be punished for the verdicts they reach. This landmark decision established the principle of jury independence, ensuring that jurors are free to decide cases according to their conscience rather than judicial coercion. This historic case demonstrates why the jury system remains essential; it protects the integrity of the trial process and ultimately ensures that justice is delivered.

Kier Starmer and Labour’s Promise to the CJS

Kier Starmer was a human right’s lawyer, practicing for over two decades; a career which saw him rising to Queen’s Counsel in 2002, and serving as Director of Public Prosecutions and head of the Crown Prosecution Service from 2008 to 2013 before entering Parliament. His prominent legal career naturally positioned him as a unique authority on the workings, and failings, of the CJS, making him – at least in theory – well-placed to advocate reform of the CJS. Labour’s manifesto underscores this, claiming that “our justice system has been allowed to grind to a halt;”^[5] and pledging to “reform the justice system to put the needs of victims first,”^[6] asserting that “victims must have faith that justice will be delivered.”^[7]

Yet these commitments ring hollow in light of recent proposals from David Lammy, the Deputy Prime Minister and Lord Chancellor, to restrict jury trials. Such measures risk undermining the very principles of fairness and transparency that the Labour manifesto claims to prioritise, exposing a clear disconnect between rhetoric and action. If Labour’s leadership cannot reconcile policy with practice, the promise of a stable, effective CJS remains aspirational rather than achievable; an irony all the more striking given Starmer’s decades of direct experience within the very system he claims to be fixing. One cannot help but question how a former Director of Public Prosecutions, intimately familiar with the demands of justice, presides over proposals that risk eroding the fairness and transparency he purports to champion.

David Lammy and the Future of Jury Trials

David Lammy has recently acknowledged the dire need for reform of the CJS. In an unprecedented move, especially given his previous remarks valorising the juries, and his insistence in 2020 that “you do not fix the backlog with trials that are widely perceived as unfair,”^[8] Lammy has now suggested that the scope of jury trials – which currently accounts for around 5% of all criminal cases - needs to be curtailed. He has proposed that certain categories of offences, particularly lower-level or high-volume cases, could be diverted away from the Crown Court and tried instead by a judge sitting alone or by a streamlined tribunal. Lammy has also raised concerns about the financial and logistical strain posed by full juries, arguing that reducing their use could accelerate the disposal of cases and alleviate record-high backlogs. Under Lammy’s plans, any offence for which the likely sentence is less than three years would be redirected to a “swift court” operating with a single judge and no jury.^[9] This represents a remarkable shift in position: once a vocal defender of jury independence, Lammy now appears willing to dilute this constitutional safeguard in pursuit of administrative expediency, raising significant concerns about the long-term implications for fairness, transparency, and public trust in criminal adjudication.

Expectedly, Lammy’s proposals have been met with outcry from the legal profession. Law Society Vice-President Brett Dixon for example said that these proposals “go too far in eroding our fundamental right to be judged by a jury of our own peers.”^[10] Such concerns reflect a broader unease that these reforms prioritise political optics over substantive solutions. A sensationalist, headline-driven approach cannot resolve the deeply entrenched problems that have accumulated in the CJS over many years. They certainly will not resolve the 78,329 outstanding cases in the Crown Court and 361,027 in the magistrates’ court as of the latest government figures (April to June 2025). Instead, it risks diverting attention from the structural failures – chronic underfunding, collapsing court infrastructure, and a depleted legal aid system – that lie at the heart of the crisis. Without addressing these systemic issues, curtailing jury trials offers only the illusion of progress while threatening long-standing constitutional safeguards. In addition, this proposal has been met by a threat to strike by the Criminal Bar Association which could see prosecutors declining work from the CPS for the first time which would lead to a ‘total meltdown’ of the system;^[11] ironically further contributing to the backlog which they are so desperate to improve.

Conclusion

The crisis facing the CJS is not the product of a single policy failing, nor can it be resolved by quick fixes disguised as reform. Labour, despite entering government with an ostensibly unparalleled depth of legal expertise, has so far offered solutions that risk weakening the very foundations of justice rather than strengthening them. Proposals to curtail jury trials may ease political pressure or create the appearance of action, but they do nothing to remedy the structural decay that has hollowed out the system over decades.

The willingness to erode constitutional safeguards under the guise of efficiency reveals a troubling mismatch between Labour’s rhetoric and its priorities in practice. The backlog, exodus of talent from criminal practice, the chronic underfunding, and the loss of public confidence cannot be solved by sidelining juries; they require long-term investment, structural reform, and a genuine commitment to restoring integrity to the justice process. 

[1] Barristers vow to ‘bring courts to their knees’ in strikes against David Lammy’s plans to slash jury trials, Daily Mail (online, 28 November 2025) https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-15360391/Barristers-courts-strikes-against-David-Lammys-jury-trials.html

[2] Office for National Statistics, Perception and experience of police and criminal justice system, England and Wales: year ending March 2025 (ONS, 19 August 2025) https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/articles/perceptionandexperienceofpoliceandcriminaljusticesystemenglandandwales/yearendingmarch2025 accessed 19 December 2025

[3] Thom Brooks, ‘The Right to Trial by Jury’ (2004) 21 Journal of Applied Philosophy 197

[4] Bushel’s Case (1671) 84 ER 1123

[5] Labour Party, Take Back Our Streets (Labour Party, 2024) https://labour.org.uk/change/take-back-our-streets/ accessed 9 December 2025

[6] ibid

[7] ibid

[8] David Lammy and the Future of Jury Trials, ‘What Are David Lammy’s Plans for the Future of Jury Trials?’ (PoliticsOnline, date unknown) https://www.politicsonline.co.uk/what-are-david-lammys-plans-for-the-future-of-jury-trials/ accessed 10 December 2025

[9] ibid

[10] New Law Journal, ‘Lammy’s overhaul of jury trials “goes too far”, say lawyers’ (3 December 2025) https://www.newlawjournal.co.uk/content/lammy%27s-overhaul-of-jury-trials-%27goes-too-far%27--say-lawyers accessed 10 December 2025

[11] (no 1)

Land Law

The Renters’ Rights Act 2025 – more or fewer rights for tenants?

By Alison Wong

The Renters’ Rights Act 2025 (RRA) received Royal Assent on 27 October 2025 and is expected to come into force in 2026 (at the time of writing). The Act is in the Labour Government’s Plan for Change manifesto which aims to rebalance the relationship between landlords and tenants in England. It attempts to address the problems of tenants being exposed to vulnerability, unfair treatment and unsafe security.

Some of the key features include ending s.21 evictions, converting all fixed-term tenancies to periodic tenancies and controlling rent increases. This edition’s section on property law will aim to unpack some of the main features of the Renters’ Rights Act and help you understand how you will be affected as a landlord/tenant.

Types of private residential tenancies

In England, there are four types of private residential tenancies - assured tenancies, assured shorthold tenancies, regulated tenancies and common law tenancies. This section will mostly focus on assured tenancies which the majority of homes fall under.

Assured tenancies are currently governed under the Housing Act 1988 (HA 1988). For assured tenancies, the tenant (or at least one of the joint tenants) is an individual and occupies the dwelling house as their only or principal home. Some tenancies cannot fall within this category, including tenancies made before 15 January 1989, business tenancies under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, licensed premises, student lettings, holiday lettings and more.[1]

Assured tenancies that are granted after 28 February 1997 are automatically assured shorthold tenancies (ASTs), unless a notice or term of the agreement states that the dwelling-house is not an AST. Some tenancies do not automatically become ASTs, for example, when assured tenancies are taken over by a partner or family member of the original tenant after death and former secure tenancies become assured tenancies.[2]

The main difference between solely assured tenancies and ASTs is how landlords gain possession of the property. For solely assured tenancies, it will be more difficult as landlords need to provide evidence that the tenants breached the tenancies under s.8 HA 1988. For ASTs, landlords can do so after the contract period expires using s.21 HA 1988.

Regulated tenancies under the Rent Act 1977 are granted before 15 January 1989. It offers stronger tenant protection as the Rent Officer sets a fair or maximum rent which tends to be lower than the market price. It is more complex to evict tenants under regulated tenancies than ASTs because grounds for possession must be proved.

Lastly, common law tenancies depend on the terms agreed between the parties, governing including but not limited to rent and eviction (still requiring a court order for eviction).

Another distinction for tenancies worth mentioning is between a fixed-term tenancy and a periodic tenancy. The former has a fixed end date and tenants are required to pay rent regardless of the conditions of the property, while the latter is the vice versa.

Key features of the Renter’s Rights Act 2025

1.     Abolishing the Housing Act 1988 s.21 evictions

Prior to the RRA’s enforcement, the HA 1988 s.21 allows landlords to recover possession of a dwelling-house under an AST. A landlord can possess it if these two conditions are met:

1)     An AST has ended and there are no other assured tenancies except a periodic AST, and

2)     the landlord has given two months’ notice (different in 2020-21 due to coronavirus). 

Landlords are not required to provide reasons or establish the tenant’s faults for eviction, which explains why the eviction is known as ‘no-fault’. Evicted tenants will be required to leave the dwelling-house before the expiry of a s.21 notice. Tenants might be able to defend possession, only if the notice is not valid or a mistake has been made, such as an unprotected deposit and discrimination against the tenants. If tenants refuse to leave, landlords can apply for a court possession order and even a warrant for eviction.

Over 11,000 households were evicted from their homes in July 2024-June 2025 using s.21 evictions.[3] The use of s.21 has caused a sense of insecurity and fear of eviction among tenants, as it could be used at anytime after a fixed-term tenancy has been expired.[4] Tenants would then need to find elsewhere to live and be exposed to the risks of homelessness if they cannot find another place.

Groups including older people and children are particularly vulnerable to the evictions. Older people with less mobility might struggle to secure structural adaptations with the landlords, while children’s education might be disrupted owing to moving homes and changing schools.[5]

The s.21 evictions also discourage tenants from requesting repairs and improved conditions, as well as reporting problems to local authorities. Although retaliatory eviction is prevented in the Deregulations Act 2015 ss.33-34, some tenants still report that they have been evicted after asking for repairs or complaining about conditions in their homes to local authorities, due to the ‘no-fault’ eviction.[6]

In light of this, the RRA s.17 will abolish the HA s.21 evictions. Landlords will be unable to evict tenants without reason. By removing the cause of fear – s.21 evictions, it seems to offer more protection and security to tenants.

2.     Amending the HA 1988 s.8 eviction grounds

The HA 1988 s.8 provides another route for landlords to seek possession of a dwelling-house under assured tenancies (including ASTs). Landlords need to rely on the sch. 2 ‘fault-based’ grounds to show that tenants have breached the terms of the tenancies. Landlords must give notice between two weeks and two months depending on the grounds. 

The Renter Rights’ Act does not abolish this possession route, and it provides more rights to both landlords and tenants. On one hand, it strengthens protection towards tenants, by introducing a 12-month protection period when possession cannot be sought, increasing the rent arrears threshold for mandatory eviction from two to three months, and extending notice periods for some grounds.

On the other hand, the RRA grants landlords with more ‘no-fault’ grounds to exercise the s.8 notice. For example, sch.1 s.2 provides a ground for possession when landlords or their close family members intend to have the dwelling-house as their only or principal home, while sch.1 s3 allows possession if landlords intend to sell the dwelling-house. There is also a new ground 4A that students should look out for in sch.1 s.10. Landlords of student accommodation can provide a written statement prior to entering the tenancy that they intend to terminate the tenancy between 1 June and 30 September to let the accommodation to other students. It shifts the s.8 notice from fault-based grounds to a mixture of both. The RRA is not the end of ‘no-fault’ evictions, but it closed evictions without reasons.

3.     All assured tenancies are becoming periodic

The Renters’ Rights Act s.1 converts all assured tenancies into periodic ones with rent periods not exceeding a month. It means that fixed-term tenancies will be abolished. This does not apply to leases with a fixed term of more than 21 years, which will be removed from assured tenancies.

The change will affect the termination of tenancies. For fixed-term tenancies, tenants can only rely on the ‘break clauses’ to give notice and terminate tenancies before the end of fixed term. All joint tenants are required to exercise the break clauses together.[7] For periodic tenancies, tenants can terminate them anytime by giving two months’ notice to quit. If one of the joint tenants gives notice of termination, the tenancy will be terminated, despite the wishes of the other tenants.[8] 

Periodic tenancies offer more flexibility to tenants to move owing to changing circumstances and ends the injustice of tenants being trapped paying for rent.[9]  This, however, also means more instability for landlords over rent, and potentially more vacant periods. In response to the RRA with increasing red tapes, over 70% of landlords planned to raise rents to absorb the cost and 81% of them would be more selective with tenants.[10] It would reduce the supply of the rental market, but the demand for rented homes will continue to grow with the population. As a result, the price of rent will be pushed up. Tenants, particularly the vulnerable groups, will also find it more difficult to rent with landlords being more selective. It can be seen as a loss of tenants’ ‘rights’ to more affordable rent and easier accessibility to rental homes.

4.     Control over rent increases and the right to challenge rent

As assured tenancies became periodic in the Renters’ Rights Act, landlords’ ability to raise rent will become subject to the HA 1988 s.13, namely once every year (52 weeks) in line with market rate. Notice must be given two months in advance to increase rent. The RRA s.56 ends rental bidding by prohibiting landlords from accepting offers to pay rent higher than what they proposed or stated. Tenants are also provided with the right to challenge the amount or increase of rent to a tribunal in s.7 RRA.  The effectiveness of the rule needs to be examined later when more guidance has been published, or when tenants file applications to tribunals.

The RRA asserts control over rent prices and increases. Any rent increases before the commencement date of the RRA are, however, unaffected in the RRA sch.6 s.6, which means landlords might seize the time to increase rents before the RRA takes effect.

Conclusion

The Renters’ Rights Act 2025, as the name suggested, brought in more tenants’ rights under assured tenancies from terminating tenancies at any time, abolishing the HA 1988 s.21 evictions to challenging rent increases. The RRA appears to be a moment of celebration for tenants’ rights, granting more flexibility, security and fair treatment to tenants than ever.

It is, however, worth bearing in mind that landlords can still seek possession to evict tenants using s.8 ‘fault’ or new ‘no-fault’ grounds. Landlords’ responses towards the RRA are likely to be increasing rent before the RRA or being more selective towards tenants, which will push up the rent prices. The effectiveness of tenants’ right to challenge unfair rent is yet to be determined. Passing the RRA can mean that tenants lose their easier access to rental homes and lower rents as they previously enjoyed. This section will continue to bring in updates from time to time regarding the RRA.

[1] Housing Act 1988 s.1

[2] Ibid, ss.19-20

[3] Ministry of Justice, ‘Mortgage and Landlord Possession Statistics: April to June 2025 (England and Wales)’ (GOV.UK, 14 August 2025) <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/mortgage-and-landlord-possession-statistics-april-to-june-2025/mortgage-and-landlord-possession-statistics-april-to-june-2025> accessed on 10 November 2025

[4] House of Commons, The end of ‘no-fault’ section 21 evictions (England) (HC 2022-2023, 08658) 20

[5] Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, A fairer private rented sector (CP 693, 2022) 5

[6] House of Commons (n 4), 21

[7] Crawley Borough Council v Ure [1996] QB 13

[8] Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council v Monk [1992] 1 All ER 1

[9] Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, ‘Guide to the Renters’ Rights Act’ < https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/guide-to-the-renters-rights-act > accessed on 10 November 2025

[10] Pegasus Insight, Landlord Trends Q3 2025 report

Commercial Law

Inside Hogan Lovells’ historic win for PrivatBank against former owners

By Ana Maria Anghel

Following an 8-year fraud battle against PrivatBank’s former owners, the High Court delivered its final judgement, finding that Messrs. Kolomoisky and Bogolyubov must pay the bank over US$3 billion in damages and costs. As stated by Richard Lewis, one of the Hogan Lovells partners advising the bank on this case, “This was one of the most complex, wide-ranging and hard-fought cases in recent memory”. Threatening to derail the country’s economic stability, the case became a testament to Kyiv’s commitment to fighting corruption.

The case revolved around “a highly complex loan recycling scheme”, which “operated through sham transactions” and “for the ultimate benefit of the Individual Defendants”. The judgment ruled that the two men misappropriated nearly US$2 billion from PrivatBank. To introduce the “Individual Defendants”: both Igor Kolomoisky and Gennadiy Bogolyubov are among Ukraine’s most powerful oligarchs and have various political connections, including the current Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

In particular, Mr Kolomoisky has close business ties with Zelenskyy. The leader’s comedy show, “Servant of the People”, was carried by Mr Kolomoisky’s television channel. Mr Kolomoisky also aided his electoral victory by circulating his campaign on the channel. Moreover, one of the oligarch’s former lawyers was appointed Zelenskyy’s chief of staff. However, the President attempted to ‘redeem’ himself by turning against Kolomoisky and supporting a statute that precludes former bank owners from reclaiming assets via judicial proceedings.

Serving over 18 million active customers and with 70% of Ukrainians using its services, PrivatBank is the largest state-owned bank in Ukraine. At the time of the scheme, between 2010 and 2016, the Individual Defendants owned a controlling stake in PrivatBank and sat on its Supervisory Board.

In December 2016, PrivatBank was declared insolvent by the National Bank of Ukraine. Within a couple of days, it was nationalised. Regulators had uncovered that the bank was undercapitalised by approximately US$5.5 billion, which they attributed primarily to fraudulent lending. Shortly after, the bank filed a lawsuit against its former owners, Igor Kolomoisky and Gennady Bogolyubov, seeking to recover stolen assets through litigation in English and U.S. courts.

The two oligarchs used their control over PrivatBank to misappropriate US$1.9 billion through a scheme of bogus lending and sham trading transactions. Between 1 November 2013 and 1 September 2014, companies connected to PrivatBank’s former owners made 270 drawdowns under 134 revolving credit facilities, with USD drawdowns totalling approximately US$2.34 billion.

The two key actors are identified as “Individual Defendants” in the judgment. That is because, to proceed with the fraud, the judge found there was also involvement by so-called “Corporate Defendants”. The bank veered towards making loans to 50 shell borrowers with no real business activity or credit history. These corporate vehicles were, however, owned or controlled by the “Individual Defendants,” with employees complying with instructions to avoid losing their jobs. The case was brought forward in English Courts as some of the companies through which the loans were made are English, with some being registered in the British Virgin Islands.

Several senior employees, including certain members of the management board, participated in this project at the direction of the Individual Defendants, notwithstanding that compliance with those instructions was clearly contrary to Ukrainian law and the Bank’s interests. Nonetheless, they did so to keep their jobs.

The High Court's judgment characterises the incident as a classic loan-recycling scheme. The Ukrainian bank issued large loans to “a network of parties related to the former UBOs of the Bank and their affiliates”. The onward flows were disguised through accounts held by shell companies controlled by the two oligarchs, to their ultimate benefit. The loans and their interest were repaid through additional loans from other parties associated with Kolomoisky and Bogolyubov. As a result, the Bank suffered a loss of at least US$5.5 billion. The fraud was described as being of “Byzantine complexity”.

Justice being served in this case was important for reasons far beyond PrivatBank itself. After Ukraine experienced extreme political turmoil through the Russian invasion and subsequent annexation of Crimea, the country entered into a US$17.1 billion arrangement with the IMF. The purpose of that was to impose tighter rules on related-party lending and stress-testing to protect the integrity of the banking system. These World Bank-driven reforms are what ultimately exposed how heavily under-capitalised PrivatBank was and what led to its nationalisation.

The state, acting through Ukraine’s Ministry of Finance bought the bank’s shares for a symbolic one hryvnia. It injected around 6% of its GDP to recapitalise it and protect roughly 20 million customers. The recapitalisation of PrivatBank is widely regarded as one of the largest banking failures in Europe relative to national output. Pursuing legal proceedings against the former owners in English and American Courts became essential to demonstrating Ukraine’s commitment to protecting public finances and delivering genuine anti-corruption reforms.

In late 2017, the English proceedings began. PrivatBank issued a joint claim against its former UBOs, with some companies used as vehicles in the scheme. In the same year, a worldwide freezing order was granted, blocking US$2.6 billion in assets. This was immediately contested by the defendants, who sought to set the freezing order aside. The litigation was far from straightforward, with PrivatBank facing a series of setbacks. In 2018, the courts upheld the challenges brought forward by the two oligarchs. This resulted in the English court being deemed to lack jurisdiction. It was ruled that the bank had overstated its incurred losses, besides the fact that the initial refusal to grant permission to appeal was upheld too. The parallel attempt by the Ukrainian oligarch to overturn PrivatBank’s nationalisation could have single-handedly undermined Ukraine's financial stability.

Nevertheless, that result was short-lived. In 2019, the Court of Appeal reversed its decision and held that PrivatBank could anchor its claims in England and sue the former owners who, at that point, were domiciled in Switzerland. Still, the parties engaged in repeated disagreements over the scope of the freezing order, asset disclosure and confidentiality arrangements, alongside extensive cross-border evidence gathering from multiple jurisdictions.

In July 2025, a lengthy judgment was delivered by the High Court in London, asserting that around US$2 billion had been misappropriated through “a highly complex loan recycling scheme which operated for the ultimate benefit of the Individual Defendants [i.e. Mr. Kolomoisky and Mr. Bogolyubov]”. The High Court recognised that the Defendant’s case was “built on dishonest foundations. The two former owners of PrivatBank, one of whom had been detained by Ukrainian authorities, did not give evidence at the 2023 trial in London. Mr Justice Trower found that the reason they refused to be cross-examined was that, by doing so, they would be pressured to answer questions to which they did not have any exculpatory answers.

The evidence produced during the trial revealed that Mr Kolomoisky had taken steps towards the destruction of data that could have facilitated the legal proceedings against them. Furthermore, Mr Bogolyubov was also engaged in destroying relevant documentation. As a result, the Judge found that Kolomoisky “seems to have regarded himself as above the law” and that Bogolyubov was “dishonest” in using the destruction of documentation as a tool to detach himself from the fraud and shift the blame onto others. They also received criticism for failing to call members of the Bank’s management as witnesses. The Judge rejected the contention that there was “not one shred of evidence” that the former owners had orchestrated the fraud. The Court highlighted that the defendants accepted the case brought against them was solid and provided no explanation for the “myriad of transactions having no evident commercial logic”. Consequently, they were found jointly liable for the sum siphoned from the bank and laundered abroad at their behest and for their personal benefit. The English companies used for channelling the loans were also found partly liable for the losses.

Kolomoisky has a record of illegal activities even beyond his involvement in this complex fraud. He was served with a notice of suspicion in regards to allegedly being behind the attempted murder of a lawyer in 2003. Additionally, he is under US sanctions for corruption, with him and his family being banned from travelling to the US in 2021. The timing of the judgement’s delivery was welcomed politically as well, subsequent to a highly disputed move by President Zelenskyy to curtail the independence of two anti-corruption agencies.

The case was led by Hogan Lovells partners Richard Lewis, Rebecca Wales, Oli Humphrey and Jenna Ralfe. The advising team also included associates such as Dan Armstrong, Dan Gritten, James Wise, Will Robinson, Alex Dowle, Claire Dumbill, Katherine Reed and John Morse.

Richard Lewis said about the case that: “The trial was one of the most complex actions to take place before the English courts. The Bank presented extensive evidence to the court detailing how billions of dollars were misappropriated from it for the benefit of Mr Kolomoisky and Mr Bogolyubov. We are delighted that the court saw through the defendants’ attempts to justify their conduct and granted the Bank’s claims in full over the course of an extremely thorough and detailed judgment, which found that they put forward dishonest evidence, deliberately destroyed and suppressed documents and sought unsuccessfully to shift the blame onto others”.

This is not the only Ukrainian-related case the firm has won this year. It served as the lead legal advisor to the Ukrainian Government in its landmark minerals agreement with the United States.

This case’s impact extends beyond PrivatBank’s interests. As Rebecca Wales, partner at Hogan Lovells, who worked on advising this case, noted: "The judgment reinforces the ability of English courts to hold powerful individuals to account, even in cases involving complex international structures.” It is a testament to the courts' commitment to upholding the standards of justice, even when cases involve influential individuals. The case serves as a deterrent to fraud and demonstrates the bank’s commitment to safeguarding its interests and those of its clients. As noted by Nils Melngailis, PrivatBank chair, this is “a monumental victory for the bank and our shareholder, the government of Ukraine, as well as for the millions of Ukrainians who rely on PrivatBank every day”.

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Economic Sanctions and the Courts: Proportionality Under Pressure

By Gabriel Ma

This year has been an especially important one for the developing doctrine of proportionality in UK public law. The doctrine of proportionality requires the court to assess whether a public authority’s interference with a protected right is justified in substance. Unlike traditional grounds, proportionality tasks the court to move beyond process and engage with substance. The Supreme Court’s decision in Re Jr ^[1] and Shvidler^[2] have both clarified and complicated the law. These cases are an epitome of the tension between judicial scrutiny and executive deference in matters of individual rights.

Notably, in Shvidler, demonstrated a division amongst judicial opinion about the role of judges in this context. The case concerned sanctions imposed under the Russia (Sanction) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 following the invasion of Ukraine. These measures froze Eugene Shvidler’s assets and detained a yacht owned by Dalston Projects Ltd. The claimants argued that these actions disproportionately interfered with their property and family life under Article 8 of the Convention. By a 4 to 1 majority, the Supreme Court upheld the detention as proportionate and emphasising the ministerial discretion in foreign affairs. The Court also took the opportunity to outline the procedural approach appellate courts should adopt when reviewing proportionality findings, through this aspect sits tangentially to the wider constitutional issues raised in the case. This case raises border constitutional issues about how the courts should strive a balance between judicial scrutiny and executive autonomy. It begs the question whether deference to ministerial assessments risks undermining the courts’ constitutional role as guardians of individual rights.

The majority judgment^[3] reaffirmed the four-stage test developed from Bank Mellat ^[4]and reaffirmed recently in Re JR ^[5]. The Court asked: 1. Whether the aim pursued was sufficiently important to justify interfering with a fundamental right; 2. Whether the measure was rationally connected to that aim; 3. Whether a less intrusive measure could have been used; and 4. Whether a fair balance had been struct between the right of the individual and the interests of the community.^[6] This structured test was a departure from the Wednesbury deference, but instead forces decision-makers to justify each step of the interference when individual rights are at stake.

The majority confirmed that the courts must make their own assessment of whether an interference with a Convention right is proportionate,^[7] but also emphasised that the public authority remains the primary decision-maker, and the appropriate weight should be given to the executive “as to how the balance between the interests of the individual and of the general community should be struct”.^[8] In the application to the facts, the Court rejected the arguments from both appellants that the sanctions on them has a “vanishingly small” effect on the prosecution of war in Ukraine. Instead, the substantial matter in question was not whether the sanction “will in themselves achieve the desired change”^[9] but rather if there is a “clear and rational connection” between the sanctions and the aim of deterring Russia. By accepting that it was unnecessary to show the sanctions would actual amount to any meaningful outcome, the Court diluted the rational connection limb (Bank Mellat test no.2 ) into a question of plausibility rather than proof. Likewise, the acceptance of a “wide margin of appreciation” at the fair balance stage illustrated the deferential justification given to the executive.

Lord Leggatt’s dissenting judgment stands in striking contrast to the majority’s deferential approach. He rejected the notion that the executive should be afforded a wide margin of appreciation, especially when fundamental rights are at stake. He insisted that courts “fail in their duty if they simply rubber-stamp assertions made by the executive to justify invading individual liberties without subjecting those assertions to critical scrutiny”.^[10] He believed that the courts are more constitutionally equipped to address whether community interests should prevail over an individual right. This is because ministers are naturally concerned with to promote collective interest, but courts are impartial parties to the dispute, and has a unique competence in “applying standards of public reasoning to adjudicate”.^[11] It is inadequate, he added, that the measure be plausibly connected to a legitimate aim, but must be demonstrated with cogent evidence and withstand scrutiny.

In fact, he did demonstrate the court’s ability to adjudicate in these matters. In [268], he scrutinised the decision with a thorough statutory construction of regulation 6(2)(a) in the definition of an involved person. For example, given the fact that Mr. Shvidler is a naturalised British citizens with no ties with the Russian military high command and no economic benefits or involvement with any persons who has been designated under the same regulations.^[12]

Lord Leggatt further criticised the language of “fair balance”, arguing that it invites an illusion of objectivity by pretending that personal rights and collective interests are a negotiable matter, similarly weighed on a common scale. He argued that “the function of rights is to set limits to the circumstances in which the interests of individuals may be overridden by the interests of the community at large”.^[13] This reasoning reflects a conception of proportionality as an independent judicial inquiry, grounded in evidence and justification rather than deference or intuition.

That said, academic Mark Elliot criticised that Lord Leggatt’s dissent was rather harsh. He found Lord Leggatt’s accusation against the majority for “deferring to the executive’s own view that it had struck a fair balance” was unfair. In his reading of para. 120-123, he did not think the majority abdicate judicial scrutiny, but instead, performed it whilst giving due weight to the executive’s expertise in foreign affairs. Mr. Elliot think Lord Leggatt rather mischaracterised that as a blind deference.^[14] 

While I agree that Lord Leggatt’s comment may appear to be “too harsh”, it is a fair comment that warrants reflection. Lord Leggatt’s stance resonates with deeper theoretical critique of proportionality. What Lord Leggatt attempts in his dissent is to re-centre proportionality around rights-reasoning rather than a matter of utilitarian interest-balancing. He resists the trends of reducing rights to mere variables in a wider calculus of social utility. To Lord Leggatt, proportionality is not merely a tool for balancing competing interests but a moral test of justification. Throughout his judgment, such as in [270], he engaged with the evidence in an attempt to draw a connection, lack thereof, between Mr. Shvidler’s position and words of the regulation. He questioned whether the state has advanced sufficient reasons, supported by evidence and statutory construction for limiting a right (to private and family life in this case). On the other hand, the majority held that as long as the sanctions against Mr. Shvidler is “reasonably… capable of contributing to the achievement of that objective”,^[15] the court will not further scrutinise. In this sense, Lord Leggatt treats rights as a categorical constraint that cannot be crossed unless grave necessity exists. His rejection of the “fair balance” metaphor follows from this view. It rests on the conviction that rights cannot be traded off against collective welfare on a common scale of value. As he put it, “the function of rights is to set limits to the circumstances in which the interest of individuals may be overridden by the interests of the community at large”.^[16]

Lord Leggatt, in [278] also put forward numerous literature in arguing the misleading term of “fair balance” which is conceptually compelling. In this debate between rights and maximisation, literature provided us from a different perspective. Urbina proposed rights to be “seen from the point of view of the person entitled to its fulfilment”,^[17] and when state interferes with a right, it is no longer a matter of optimising outcomes but a matter of justice. Urbina also cautions that the misassumption of maximisation perspectives in proportionality tests, which questions whether the measure produces the “greater satisfaction” of all relevant values, will inevitably sideline considerations of what is due to the individual, such that “rights are moved out of the picture”.^[18] Viewed through this lens, Lord Leggatt’s dissent provokes a deeper reflection. The sanctions in Shvidler exemplify precisely the concerns Urbina identifies. A judicial method that privileges abstract policies effectiveness over concrete rights justification. The interferences with the rights of both appellants appear to have achieved no tangible advancement of national security, nor any discernible contribution toward ending the war in Ukraine.

In practice, Mr Shvidler’s designation and the detention of Dalston Projects’ luxury yacht were symbolic rather than strategic. The Government produced no evidence that either measures had influenced Russian decision-making, altered financial flows to the Kremlin, or even conveyed a meaningful deterrent signal beyond the sphere of domestic publicity. Mr Shvidler, a dual British-American citizen with noncontinuing business or political ties to the Russian state, was sanctioned largely on the basis of historic association with another designed individual. The yacht detained under the Transport Secretary’s order was beneficially owned by Mr Naumenko, who himself, was not designed.^[19] Yet both were subjected to measures that gravely interfered with property and family life, without any demonstrable causal connection to the legitimate aim pursued. In this light, the case reflects the danger of what Urbina terms the maximisation perspective, and what Lord Leggatt cautioned against the judiciary “rubber-stamping” policies. The state justifies rights restriction on the premise that any marginal contribution to an overarching public good is enough. Such reasoning, dangerously ignores that the individuals affected are not mere data points in a wider policy calculation, but are holders of concrete rights.

As this case has reached the court of last instance, it is now up to the parties to decided whether this shall proceed to the ECtHR. While the SC confined judicial scrutiny to whether the Government’s decision was reasonably capable of achieving its stated aim, the ECtHR employs margin of appreciation as a self-imposed restraint in a doctrine of subsidiarity, not deference.^[20] Once a case reaches Strasbourg, the Court undertakes a more searching inquiry into whether the interference correspond to a “pressing social need” and be “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.”

This is where the Court first explained that it is not enough that a measure be useful or desirable, but rather it must be necessary in a democratic society.^[21] This approach represents a more substantive and intrusive review than the SC’s plausibility test, but the ECtHR has also recognised that “state authorities are in principle in a better position” to give such an opinion.^[22]

Shvidler demonstrates that the Court still accords substantial deference to the executive, particularly where foreign policy and national security involved through an adoption of reasonably capable test. This approach rightly preserves institutional balance, but Lord Leggatt’s strong dissent exposes the unresolved tension between judicial restraint and judicial responsibility. It invites us to reflect on whether proportionality in the UK continues to strike the right balance between respecting executive expertise and ensuring meaningful judicial protection of individual rights.

[1] Re JR [2025] UKSC 8.

[2] Shvidler; Dalston Projects Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport [2025] UKSC 30.

[3] Delivered jointly by Lord Sales and Lady Rose with Lord Reed and Lord Richards concurring.

[4] Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39.

[5] Re JR (no. 1).

[6] The question of “fair balance” played a huge role in Lord Leggatt’s dissent.

[7] Shvidler (no. 2) [120]

[8] Ibid, [123].

[9] Ibid, [174].

[10] Ibid, [256].

[11] Ibid, [283-284].

[12] Ibid, [270]: shows that his involvement with designated person Mr. Roman Abramovich is minimal and indirect.

[13] Ibid, [279].

[14] Mark Elliott, ‘The Supreme Court’s judgment in Shvidler: Lord Leggatt’s Liversidge v Anderson moment’ (Public Law for Everyone, 29 July 2025) https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2025/07/29/the-supreme-courts-judgment-in-shvidler-lord-leggatts-liversidge-v-anderson-moment/ accessed 10 November 2025.

[15] Ibid, [174].

[16] Shvidler (no. 2), [279].

[17] Francisco Urbina, A Critique of Proportionality and Balancing (2017), p.95.

[18] Ibid, p. 99.

[19] Shvidler, (no. 2), [60].

[20] Masterman p.725

[21] Handyside v United Kingdom [1976] ECHR 5 [48]–[50].

[22] Ibid.

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“Preparation, Preparation, Preparation” - Camilla Bingham KC on Success at the Commercial Bar.

By Krishan Sharma

Camilla Bingham KC’s career at the Commercial Bar has spanned some of the most complex, high-value litigation of the last decades. From landmark Supreme Court appeals to high-stakes disputes involving the most cutting-edge and recent current affairs, her work has placed her at the centre of some of the most consequential legal issues of the modern age. Yet the path to her position and the principles she follows in each case offer a compelling portrait of what excellence at the Commercial Bar truly looks like and what it takes to get there.

When asked about the motivations and ambitions in pursuing a career at the Commercial Bar, Bingham’s path emerged as not so conventional. After studying Classics at university, her choice of practice area was not the result of a single, clear calling, but rather a process of thoughtful elimination. When she undertook the law conversion, she recalls that the future of the Criminal Bar itself felt uncertain, while human rights law, though intriguing, was still in its infancy as a recognised practice area at the Bar. Other options, such as personal injury or broader negligence work, did not spark her interest; she could not picture herself building a career in those fields. Yet, if doing it all again, she says she would now have chosen the Commercial Bar without hesitation, praising the field as intellectually stimulating, constantly evolving, and deeply connected to real-world issues affecting global business. In her career, she has had to engage with rapidly changing realities, from the challenges posed by COVID-19 and war-related disruptions to entirely new legal frontiers.

When it came to choosing One Essex Court, Bingham’s answer was emphatic: “because it’s the best.” With its longstanding reputation for excellence at the Commercial Bar, the set consistently attracts some of the most high-profile and complex work available. At the time she joined, it was also regarded as one of the less “stuffy” chambers, free from the pomposity she had observed elsewhere. She is equally quick to praise the clerks’ room, which she describes as the best in the Temple: modern, highly professional, yet unfailingly friendly.

When reflecting on her career, Bingham does not single out one particular case as the definitive highlight. For her, the most memorable moments are not tied to landmark judgments, but rather to the cases where she worked with an exceptional team. She notes that even in her most high-profile cases, such as Cavendish v El Makdessi, which reshaped the law on penalty clauses, the essence of her approach has remained the same. While the scale and atmosphere of the Supreme Court differed greatly from appearing at first instance, the underlying principles of preparation were constant. She recalls the true highlights being the collaborative nature of the Bar, working alongside outstanding co-counsel and instructing solicitors, which has been at the heart of many of her most rewarding experiences. Bingham emphasises that teamwork is a crucial ingredient for success at the Commercial Bar and that building strong, lasting professional relationships is essential.

While reflecting on the changes she has witnessed over her career at the Bar, Bingham notes that commercial practice is inherently dynamic. Sudden shifts in the economy and global geopolitics constantly reshape the nature of the work. She points to the current wave of cases arising from the war in Ukraine, particularly disputes over the transportation of aircraft, spanning aviation, insurance, and frustration claims. Yet, she is quick to stress that such surges are not unprecedented; similar bursts of work emerged during the global financial crisis and in the wake of COVID-19. For Bingham, however, the single biggest change has not been the types of cases she handles, but the technological advances which have impacted the pace and manner of commercial practice. As to advisory work, instructions no longer arrive by courier wrapped in a pink ribbon with advice being delivered in conference some days later: a bundle of documents can be transmitted instantaneously with advice following by video conference in a matter of hours. As to court work, the COVID-19 lockdown transformed the logistics of advocacy, and those changes continue to resonate. She cites an ongoing case involving 40 or so defendants, which is being conducted in a hybrid format given the spatial constraints of the courtroom. Remote hearings, she observes, create a unique challenge: the principles

of good advocacy remain the same, but delivering them becomes harder. Without the atmosphere of the courtroom or the ability to read a judge’s body language, it is more difficult to discern how a given submission is being received.

This need to adapt leads Bingham to one of the most important lessons she has learned at the Commercial Bar: tailoring advocacy to the audience. In the criminal courts, barristers may employ theatrics to persuade a jury, but in commercial cases, the audience is a judge. Submissions must be targeted, clear, and methodical. At times, it is obvious that a judge has not had the chance to read the bundle in detail, and in such cases, it becomes essential to guide them through it carefully. The same applies when appearing in overseas courts, where local judicial styles vary; the underlying principles of advocacy remain the same, but success depends on calibrating one’s approach to the individual judge.

Alongside adapting to the audience, Bingham offers another crucial lesson concerning cross-examination. Expert witnesses in commercial cases, she explains, can be especially challenging because their fields are often highly specialised. “Preparation, preparation, preparation” is her mantra. Good cross-examination requires you, as the advocate, to become a “mini expert” yourself, so you can understand the witness’s responses and follow up without being derailed by technical jargon. Preparation must extend to the structure of the cross-examination itself. Bingham likens it to a flowchart; anticipate every possible answer to your questions so you are never caught off guard. Most importantly, she advises starting with the end in mind, knowing in advance the key answer you want to elicit, the “fist bump” moment when the witness is caught, and then working backwards to build towards it. Underpinning all of this, she says, is one constant truth: the best advocates are the best prepared.

When reflecting on diversity at the Bar, Bingham notes that while gender balance has improved to some extent over the course of her career, progress remains slow. Only a third of applicants to One Essex Court are women, a statistic that she says is not good enough: more must be done to encourage applications from women, and as Head of Pupillage at OEC, Bingham misses no opportunity to do just that. She believes passionately that women can thrive at the Commercial Bar and insists that it is fallacious for female law students to suppose that the path to success at a law firm is somehow more straightforward than the path to success at the Bar. As a mother of four, Bingham has first-hand experience of how the Commercial Bar can accommodate working parents. She explains that the flexibility of practice is genuine: you can block out time, set your own schedule, and still build a successful career without the pressure of the billing targets and business development obligations facing your counterparts at magic circle firms. OEC now runs outreach days, seminars, and other targeted initiatives to encourage more women to apply, albeit it does not operate quotas. In her view, the will to improve all forms of diversity already exists across the profession; what is required is sustained and consistent effort to ensure that the Bar is accessible to all.

Finally, when asked for her advice to aspiring commercial barristers, Bingham’s message is clear: academic excellence is non-negotiable. To secure a commercial pupillage, you should strive for top grades complemented by scholarships and prizes. Post-graduate qualifications are not required. Mooting and other forms of public speaking, she explains, can be a differentiator, while sporting achievements can demonstrate commitment, resilience and discipline. Above all, Bingham emphasises the importance of self-awareness, knowing your strengths, recognising where you need to improve, and approaching the profession with openness, collaboration, and a willingness to learn. The Commercial Bar demands a lot, she reflects, but it gives back just as much.